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This research project is being conducted for the Board of Directors
created by a group of manufacturers of chemically produced wood pulp, pur-
suant to Sponsorship Agreements (this group of companies hereinafter referred
to as the Smelt-Water Research Group). This report, or any portions thereof,
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Engineering, Inc., and The Institute of Paper Chemistry.
In view of the tentative nature of research results and the intermediate
stage of the research here reported, readers are cautioned against drawing
premature conclusions and are advised to await definite recommendations
which will be offered when the significance of the technical work has been
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THE INSTITUTE OF PAPER CHEMISTRY
Appleton, Wisconsin
RESEARCH ON SMELT-WATER REACTIONS
SEVENTH ACTIVITY REPORT OF PROJECT CO-ORDINATOR
TO ADVISORY TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
This report covers activities of the Project Co-ordinator from
June 23 to September 22, 1965. Work by the research organizations of The
Babcock & Wilcox Company and of Combustion Engineering, Inc. is presented
in the attached reports, covering the period from June 4 to August 27, 1965.
The Project Co-ordinator visited the B&W Research Center on August 19 and
27 and met with B&W representatives in Chicago on September 21. Discus-
sions were held at the Kreisinger Development Laboratory of CE on September
8-10.
Studies of the chemical aspects of smelt-water reactions have been
extended by Babcock & Wilcox research to contact of liquid water with molten
smelt. Confirming earlier experiments with smelt and water vapor at B&W,
hydrogen generation has been shown, accompanied by the production of smaller
amounts of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. Significant proportions of
the water are reacting on injection into smelt, in amounts varying from 10
to 55%.
Substantiating the work of B&W on hydrogen evolution, the genera-
tion of hydrogen from smelt-water contact has also been consistently observed,
largely on a qualitative basis, in the experiments conducted by Combustion
Engineering during more than the past year. When smelt at CE has been ini-
tially heated to a temperature above its explosive range, injections of
water into smelt in an air atmosphere result in evaporation of water and
burning of hydrogen on the smelt surface. This behavior may be repeated with
several successive injections of water until the smelt cools to within the
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explosive range and an explosion occurs. In these experiments, the high
temperature level of molten smelt provides an ignition source and the hydro-
gen burns nonexplosively since the air provides sufficient oxygen to support
combustion. In the absence of sufficient oxygen to support combustion, the
hydrogen might form a fuel-rich gas mixture which could later explode if
mixed with air in combustible proportions in the presence of an ignition source.
In considering the significance to furnace explosions of water gas
generation, and subject to further work by B&W, it appears to the Project Co-
ordinator that the above reasoning would also apply to hydrogen and carbon
monoxide produced from water in contact with hot carbon in the char bed. As
a third source, combustible gases can be generated from black liquor pyrolysis
and probably are produced, for the most part, at temperatures below ignition
levels. These gases are therefore not as likely to be burned at the point of
origin, and they should be regarded as a potential hazard whenever conditions
for the production and ignition of an explosive gas mixture exist. We have
no indications that hydrogen or other combustible gases are generated by re-
actions which are explosive in themselves.
The recent B&W observation of a possible correlation between produc-
tion of CO and CO2 and the violence of smelt-water interaction may indicate
an influence of chemical reaction on the energy release rate. Furthermore,
present work by B&W on the possible presence of elemental sodium in smelt
may indicate the need to recognize a hazardous chemical smelt-water reaction
involving sodium.
The previous B&W progress report (July 1, 1965) proposed a theory
of exothermic chemical reactions based on the possibility of combination of
water with Na20, hydration of NaOH, or solubility of water in smelt. The
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present progress report from Combustion Engineering describes laboratory
results which indicate that physical explosive reactions of water with smelt
in the presence of Na20 or NaOH are not significantly different than the be-
havior of water with smelts containing equal quantities of NaC1. NaC1 is not
expected to react or hydrate with water and it influences the behavior of
physical smelt-water explosions by increasing the intensity without changing
the basic nature of the explosion. It is, therefore, concluded that Na20
and NaOH, which act similarly to NaCl, are not major factors in the mechanism
of the physical smelt-water reactions being studied at CE, although the con-
centration of these additives influences the intensity of the explosion.
The extreme rapidity of the physical smelt-water explosions at CE,
as indicated by a pressure wave duration of 0.1 to 3 milliseconds, is consid-
ered to be insufficient time for a significant amount of water to become
soluble in smelt, or to react chemically for the production of exothermic
heat liberation or the generation of combustible gas. The pressure rise
times of 100 to 250 milliseconds reported by the present B&W progress report
for the initial pressure vessel experiments average approximately 100 times
slower than those measured in CE laboratory explosions. Comparison of the pres-
sure traces in the two reports indicates that there are fundamental differences
between the experiments reported by the two laboratories. Additional data
from the B&W experiments are essential before firm conclusions can be drawn
regarding the mechanism of the reactions currently being studied at the B&W
Research Center.
In addition to the work previously referred to, the Combusion
Engineering progress report further clarifies our understanding of the concept
of physical smelt-water reactions as applied both to laboratory explosions
and to furnace explosions that have recently been studied. The emphasis
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of the CE program is properly shifting from studies of the physical smelt-
water explosion mechanism to efforts to develop means to prevent explosions
of this type.
It has been suggested that sodium sulfate, normally present in
smelt in small amounts, might prove to be an explosion inhibitor if present
in larger quantities. The current CE report covers a range of sodium sulfate
additions from 5 to 17.5% and shows that sodium sulfate is not effective in
preventing physical smelt-water explosions. Interest continues in an addi-
tive which would truly inhibit the explosive behavior of smelt-water systems,
but all trials to this point have failed to identify a promising smelt modi-
fier.
Numerous CE laboratory experiments have demonstrated that high
sulfidity smelts or smelts containing sodium chloride tend toward greater
explosive sensitivity and violence. In order to test the effectiveness of
safe quenching solutions under the most severe conditions, the CE program
has worked with high sulfidity smelts with varying sodium chloride additions
and a wide range of solutions of ammonium salts. It is encouraging that 40%
ammonium sulfate solution, under a variety of conditions, has safely quenched
smelts that would normally be violently explosive. Further work in this
direction is well justified.
The research project continues to receive assistance from special-
ized consultants. Dr. G. C. Williams, M.I.T., has been a source of ready
information on explosion technology. He has recently calculated the pressure
traces that might be expected from combustible gas explosions in an operating
furnace under a variety of assumed conditions. These pressure traces will
be used in calculations now being made by Mr. R. R. Robinson, Illinois
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Institute of Technology Research Institute, for a structural analysis of
the damage pattern of the explosion at Southwest Forest Industries,
Snowflake, Arizona.
The Project Co-ordinator has continued to try to establish contact
with sources of information which might be helpful to this research project.
It has been thought that smelt-water explosions might have some features in
common with volcanic action, and inquiries to the U. S. Geological Survey
led to a meeting of H. S. Gardner and W. Nelson with Dr. Edwin Roedder,
experimental geologist, in Washington, D. C. While the discussion was an
interesting one, we were unable to establish any meaningful relation between
our work and the research with which Dr. Roedder was familiar. Contacts
have recently been made, largely by telephone, with the program on Chemistry
of Molten Salts of the Gordon Research Conferences, the Cak Ridge National
Laboratory, the Advisory Committee on Hazardous Materials of the National
Academy of Sciences-U. S. Coast Guard, the Safety and Fire Protection
Committee of the Manufacturing Chemists' Association, the Safety Directors
of the du Pont, Dow Chemical, and Sun Oil companies, the research departments
of E. F. Houghton & Co., and American Oil Company, and Dr. George T. Austin,
Washington State University. While these various contacts have touched upon
a wide range of interests in molten salt and safety technology, we have found
no previous experience or present research activity in the scientific funda-
mentals which relate to our problems in research on smelt-water reactions.
In response to a request from the Project Co-ordinator to sponsor
companies of this project, general information and recorder charts from
oxygen-combustible analyzers have been furnished for study of fourteen
emergency situations. There is no consistent pattern relating the furnace
atmospheres to any particular type of emergency. In four situations
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combustible gas concentrations, measured at the boiler outlet, were indi-
cated for periods of one to five minutes at concentrations of 3.2, +5, 9.2,
and +10%. In these situations, the corresponding oxygen contents were low,
and no explosion occurred. When the combustible concentration dropped
suddenly, the oxygen content rose equally rapidly and an air-rich condition
was quickly established. Apparently, the combination of a combustible gas
composition and an effective source of ignition did not occur under any of
these four circumstances of power failure, loss of I. D. fan, boiler tube
failure, and boiler tube failure followed by power trip of fans and liquor
pump. The other ten situations studied included four cases in which the
emergency shutdown procedure had included shutting down the F. D. fan and
blacking out the char bed. In these situations, the combustible content
of the furnace stack gas was negligible in two cases and showed brief peaks
of 0.4 and 1% in the other two cases. The oxygen content was consistently
high. It would appear that the pyrolysis products of the black liquor were
either negligible or had been effectively burned and that the furnaces had
been in no danger at any time from combustible gas explosions. It is hoped
that the sponsor companies will bring to the attention of the Project Co-
ordinator the history of any emergency situations, hopefully survived with-
out explosions, so that the maximum amount of information may be learned
from them.
In an effort to develop data on the temperatures, gas compositions,
and other salient features of furnace shutdowns, The Babcock & Wilcox Com-
pany and Combustion Engineering, Inc. have under consideration, in co-opera-
tion with mill operators, a program of plant tests. The expense of these
test programs is not being met by the Smelt-Water Research Project, and they
are not a formal part of the program. They represent individual efforts on
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the part of the boiler companies and their customers. The first of these
furnace tests, at D. M. Bare Company on July 23, is reported by B&W in its
current progress report. Two observers from CE and the Project Co-ordinator
were present at the test. In view of the need to prevent combustible gas
explosions as well as physical smelt-water explosions during emergency shut-
downs, this test program is expected to contribute importantly to a better
understanding of furnace behavior under simulated emergency procedures. As
further information becomes available, it will be reported.
In co-operation with Wharton Nelson of CE, the Project Co-ordinator
visited the plant of Allied Paper Corporation, Jackson, Alabama, to observe
the results of a furnace explosion occurring on August 14. The probability
of a combustible gas explosion is regarded as unlikely, since four flame-
monitored gas hearth burners and four of six liquor burners were in service
and the furnace operation had been steady for over thirty minutes following
a blackout. Presence of wet char in the char bed, presumably accumulated
during the blackout, supports the belief that the explosion mechanism was
a physical smelt-water reaction. However, the absence of any readily apparent
permanent localized damage in the hearth indicates that the explosive force
was not severe, as compared to the earlier localized floor damage at the
Georgia-Pacific Crossett mill or at Longview Fibre Company. The upper fur-
nace wall, buckstay, and economizer roof damage was relatively light, and
the furnace was restored to service in three days. The mill management was
most co-operative in providing assistance for a thorough investigation of
this incident.
In the course of this research, the Project Co-ordinator has
observed the circumstances of nine recovery furnace explosions, with damage
patterns covering a wide range of severity, requiring from three days to ten
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weeks for repairs. In six of the nine explosions, the evidence points toward
the probability of a physical smelt-water explosion mechanism. These six
explosions are those at Thurso, Potlatch, Fibreboard, S. D. Warren at Muskegon
(secondary explosion), Georgia-Pacific at Crossett (the two later explosions
which followed an auxiliary fuel explosion), and Allied Paper (August, 1965).
In considering the three other explosions, the Project Co-ordinator has been
unable to make a satisfactory distinction between the possibilities of a
physical smelt-water explosion or a combustible gas explosion from the
pyrolysis of black liquor or from chemical reactions of the char-smelt-water
system. These three unresolved explosions were at Bowaters (Catawba), Allied
Paper (January, 1965), and Southwest Forest Industries at Snowflake. Without
attempting to present the differing viewpoints, it should be indicated that
Mr. Wharton Nelson, Combustion Engineering, who visited the Allied mill with
the Project Co-ordinator after the January explosion, has concluded in the
present CE progress report that this was probably a physical smelt-water
explosion. Similarly, representatives of The Babcock & Wilcox Company, and
others, have concluded that the explosions at Catawba and Snowflake were
probably caused by combustible gases generated during emergency shutdowns.
In view of these contrasting evaluations of the evidence, it is
obvious that it is frequently difficult to determine with reasonable confi-
dence the mechanism by which a recovery furnace explosion has occurred. When
a physical smelt-water explosion is of sufficient magnitude to produce highly
localized deformation, such evidence can be regarded as positive identifica-
tion. However, physical explosions involving smaller quantities of water or
of smelt, whichever is controlling, can be of such smaller magnitude that
their energy is. absorbed without producing localized damage. Floor tube
leaks, when small, are illustrations of this type of nondestructive explosion,
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giving evidence of the presence of water within the furnace by a sudden
noise, positive pressure, a jar that may only open poorly-latched doors, and
possibly a disturbance of the shape of the char bed. Unless a physical ex-
plosion is severe, a localized damage pattern may not be evident on sub-
sequent inspection.
Damage from a severe physical smelt-water explosion, however, can-
not be expected to be limited to the hearth of the furnace, and may not even
be concentrated in the lower portion of the furnace. Damage will occur wher-
ever the applied stresses of the decaying pressure wave from the explosion
exceed the structural strength of the furnace. Since the construction is
significantly stronger near the bottom of the furnace, the hearth can with-
stand greater stresses than can the center points of the furnace wall panels.
The upper part of a recovery furnace can be expected to sustain a degree of
damage corresponding to the magnitude of the pressure wave that reaches it.
At the present time, we cannot distinguish, in upper furnace damage, between
the effects of a combustible gas explosion and a physical smelt-water explo-
sion, since each may produce the same generalized damage pattern at a signif-
icant distance from the point of origin of the explosion.
The current CE progress report presents a section on Theory on
Distribution of Furnace Damage which calls attention to the deformation
pattern observed in large I-beams supporting furnace floors in two explosions
considered to have been physical smelt-water explosions. In one of these,
at Georgia-Pacific (Crossett), the unsymmetrical deformation of the floor
beams is well correlated with the floor tube localized depressions and is
further evidence of the intense localized energy release of physical smelt-
water explosions. This is the only situation in which an effort has been
made to obtain a detailed pattern of localized floor beam deflections. As
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a result of CE's recognition of their significance, such measurements may
prove to be a useful tool in studying the effects of furnace explosions.
We now intend to investigate the pattern of floor beam deflections in other
furnaces which have had explosions. We hope that such measurements may help
to identify the explosion mechanism.
The following general conclusions are indicated:
1. The reality of noncombustible smelt-water explosions, both in
furnace explosions and in laboratory studies at Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
has been conclusively demonstrated.
2. The concept of physical smelt-water explosions initiated by
the encapsulation of liquid water within smelt is a useful working hypoth-
esis to explain the observed facts related to noncombustible smelt-water
explosions.
5. Furnace protection from noncombustible smelt-water explosions
requires prevention of the contact of smelt by any possible source of liquid
water, other than strong black liquor.
4. Elimination of noncombustible smelt-water explosions requires
the development of new techniques, probably additives to smelt, boiler water,
or both, to prevent the physical explosive reaction of water and smel. The
present prospects for a successful development of this kind are not promising.
5. A significant improvement in the safety of emergency shutdowns
after smelt-water emergencies have been recognized may result from the develop-
ment of a safe quenching solution such as ammonium sulfate, or the use of
strong black liquor, to rapidly cool smelt below the critically explosive
temperature range in which physical explosions with water have been shown to
occur.
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6. The significance of smelt-water-char chemical reactions to
recovery furnace explosions, other than explosions from the ignition of com-
bustible gaseous mixtures with oxygen, remains to be demonstrated.
7. Regardless of the ultimate significance of combustible gas
generation by chemical reaction or black liquor pyrolysis, air dilution to
maintain a fuel-lean furnace atmosphere below the explosive composition
range and/or steam inerting offer furnace protection against combustible
gas explosions during emergency shutdowns.
THE INSTITUTE OF PAPER CHEMISTRY
Howard S. Gardner
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Center for the Board of Directors, Smelt-Water Research Group and no
reproduction or other use of the information contained herein is permitted
without the written approval of the Advisory Technical Committee, The
Babcock & Wilcox Company, Combustion Engineering, Inc., and The Institute
of Paper Chemistry.
PROGRESS REPORT NO. 6 OF THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY
ACTIVITIES ON INVESTIGATION OF SMELT-WATER REACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the work accomplished between June 4, 1965 and August
27, 1965 and the present status of this project. As outlined in our previous re-
ports, our over-all objective is to determine (a) whether, and (b) which, chemical
reactions occur between the smelt-char-combustion gas system with water that result
in explosions. A further objective is to determine the thermal decomposition pro-
ducts of black liquor. Having reached an understanding of the chemical reactions
taking place, a sounder basis for preventive measures and procedures may be formu-
lated.
In our previous progress report, we showed that the reaction of water vapor
with liquid smelt was largely one of hydrogen production, with the generation of
smaller quantities of CO and CO2. As the experiments were carried out under
steady-state conditions (approximating equilibrium) the yields of gases would
be expected to be greater than would be obtained from a fast liquid water-smelt
reaction. Therefore, our experimental laboratory work was concentrated on this
latter reaction during this report period. In addition, as a result of our work
on the study of the products of black liquor decomposition reported in Progress
Report No. 4, a shut-down procedure test was carried out at the D. M. Bare Co.,
Roaring Springs, Pennsylvania.
SUMMARY OF WORK
1. The molten smelt-liquid water reaction has been studied
experimentally with the following tentative results:
(a) Hydrogen yields ranged from 11%-55%, depending upon
experimental conditions. Any of these amounts would be
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explosive if mixed with air in combustible proportions and an
ignition source were present.
(b) High smelt temperatures favor higher yields of hydrogen.
(c) Yields of hydrogen were not markedly affected by sulfidity.
(d) There is an apparent inverse relationship between hydrogen
yields and CO2 yields.
(e) One test with green liquor showed an increased yield of
hydrogen.
(f) One test, 3 cc of water vs 1 cc of water, showed that the
larger quantity of water reduced the hydrogen yield slightly.
(g) Each of six successive injections (except the second) of water
into sodium carbonate gave lower yields of CO2 and a final
yield of 4.4% NaOH.
2. Pressure transducer measurements showed pressure rises from 3-7 psi
from the smelt-water reaction. Rise times, in general, were approxi-
mately 100-250 milliseconds. Smelts that gave the sharpest rises
were usually blown out of the crucible. A rough correlation could
be made between CO2 production and a low order of indicated violence.
3. A study of the water-gas reaction was initiated.
4, Test planning and equipment preparation were carried out in order to
study whether sodium is soluble in smelt at operating temperatures.
5. A successful test of a shut-down procedure, based on the concept of
no black liquor quenching, no primary air flow and an air-rich at-
mosphere in the unit at all times was carried out.
CONCLUSIONS
As a result of our work during this quarter, we have reached the follow-
ing tentative conclusions:
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1. Liquid water, injected into molten smelt, can react chemically and
result in the production of significant quantities of hydrogen.
Carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are also formed in relatively
small amounts.
2. Based upon one test, it appears that Kraft recovery boilers can be
shut down safely and successfully with no gaseous explosive hazard,
using the concept of insuring an air-rich mixture in the unit at all
times.
THEORETICAL
Water-Gas Reaction. The water-gas reaction is the well known reaction
taking place between carbon and water to yield CO and hydrogen.
C + H20 C CO + H AH = +32,450 Kcal
This reaction is pertinent to the smelt-char-water explosion problem from at
least two points of view: (a) it is a potential source of explosive gas, (b) it
generates two moles of gas from every mole of water reacting, hence could con-
tribute to a pressure rise.
This reaction, however, tends to be self-quenching, as may be inferred
from its positive AH. Furthermore, although the equilibrium is favorable at
all temperatures above 1000 F, kinetic studies (1) have shown that yields approach
equilibrium at about 2000 F. Therefore, in view of these factors, this reaction
is being examined theoretically in order to obtain some insight as to its possible
significance. To date, no firm conclusions have been reached as to the reaction's
contribution to the over-all explosion problem.
EXPERIMENTAL
Apparatus
A diagram of our experimental apparatus is shown in Figure 1. This apparatus
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is basically a standard Autoclave Engineer's 1 gallon reactor, designed for 5000
psi at 650 F and modified for the present experimental purposes. A small furnace,
wound with 16 gauge Kanthal heater wire was inserted into the bottom portion of
the reactor. The furnace is insulated from the reactor proper with insulating
brick on the bottom and Kaowool around the sides. A stainless steel crucible
(2 1/4" I.D., 1 1/2" deep) fits into the furnace and is formed such that it
contains a protective shoulder over the furnace and its insulation. A sheathed
thermocouple indicates the melt temperature. The water injection system consists
of a hypodermic syringe, adjustable to furnish a fixed amount of water. The syringe
tubing, stainless steel, was .066" O.D. and .0465" I.D.. A Conax fitting was
attached to the connecting sheath to form a gas-tight connection for the water
injection inlet system. The static pressure generated was measured with a
pressure gauge, as well as a mercury manometer. The transient pressure peaks
were indicated by a Kistler 601H Quartz pressure transducer, and a Honeywell
Visicorder. An inlet-outlet system allowed the vessel to be evacuated, filled
with helium gas, and gas samples to be taken for analysis.
PROCEDURE
Smelt Preparation
Two different procedures for preparing synthetic smelt were followed. One
procedure, designated as A, was as follows: The calculated amount of Na2S.5H20,
reagent grade and Na2C03, reagent grade to give a 35% NaS-65% Na2C03 smelt was
heated in a graphite crucible in a muffle furnace to 2000 F and held at that
temperature for 10 minutes. The crucible was cooled to room temperature in
an inert atmosphere, the smelt removed and stored in a desiccator prior to
charging into the reaction apparatus. Procedure B followed the procedure out-
lined in previous reports; i.e., reagent grade Na2 S.9H20 was dehydrated by
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heating to 500 F under a vacuum, then mixed in the proper amount with Na2C03 , and
this dry mixture charged to the reactor.
Test Procedure
The sample charge (115-125 gms) was placed in the crucible in the reactor
and the reactor was then evacuated and the air atmosphere replaced with helium
at one atmosphere pressure. The crucible furnace was then turned on and the charge
heated to 1800 F for ten minutes, then the temperature allowed to cool to test
temperature. The gas was analyzed, then drawn off and replaced with helium at
one atmosphere pressure. The thermocouple leads were attached to the recorder.
The Visicorder was actuated (generally at 1 in./sec) and distilled, deaerated,
room temperature water was injected through the hypodermic tubing. The pressure
rise was noted on the manometer and a gas sample, drawn through a dehydrating
agent, was taken and analyzed on the gas chromatograph for C02, CO, and H2.
If no fast peak was observed on the Visicorder, the gas atmosphere was again
replaced with one atmosphere of helium and the injection procedure repeated.
In most cases where sharp pressure peaks were observed, it was found that the
smelt had been blown out of the crucible and most was found symmetrically dis-
tributed around the shoulder of the crucible, with some splattering on the sides
of the vessel.
RESULTS
A total of ten runs were made, two of which were made on pure sodium
carbonate, the remainder on synthetic smelts. A summary of these results is
shown in Table I.
The smelt charge in Run B-2 was most unusual in that it apparently con-
tained a large residual quantity of sodium hydroxide.* This smelt also
contained a significant amount of carbon from the graphite crucible.
*Conventional chemical analysis does not distinguish between sodium hydroxide
and sodium oxide. In this and future references to sodium hydroxide, it should
be kept in mind that the sodium hydroxide could possibly be sodium oxide, or a
combination of sodium hydroxide and oxide.
In the analysis of the results, this run has therefore been disregarded.
DISCUSSION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS
Hydrogen Yields
It will be noted from Table I that all injections of water into smelt yielded
significant amounts of hydrogen, although the amounts found were somewhat dependent
upon the experimental conditions. Thus, it appears that an item of particular sig-
nificance to the Kraft recovery explosion problem is that hydrogen is perhaps
generated in sufficient quantities to result in a gas explosion if suddenly mixed
with air in combustible proportions and an ignition source is present. It should
be kept in mind that, in our viewpoint, there are several interrelated variables
affecting the yields of the various gases, and that to draw firm conclusions would
require a large number of carefully controlled experiments. Nevertheless, there
are some effects that are indicated by our results and are discussed below.
Effect of Temperature
The effect of temperature on hydrogen yields can be most clearly indicated
by a consideration of runs B-3, B-4, B-6, and B-7 in which the smelt was prepared
by the same procedure and investigated at a range of temperatures.
Figure 2 shows the trend toward increasing hydrogen yields at higher tem-
peratures.
This increased yield of hydrogen is consistent with equilibrium constant
calculations of the effect of temperature on the reaction
1/4 Na2S + H20 1/4 Na2 SO4 + H2
and verifies that in this temperature range the reaction of water with sodium
sulfide is endothermic. It furthermore is consistent with the viewpoint that
the experimental explosion studies carried out by B&W some years ago could be
explained by the production of hydrogen and subsequent ignition. The explosions
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obtained in that study became more pronounced at higher temperatures and this
would be expected if the hydrogen production increased as a function of tem-
perature.
This increased hydrogen production at higher temperatures, on the other hand,
is inconsistent with our theoretical equilibrium calculations of a smelt-water
system shown in our last progress report. These calculations indicated that
the higher temperature should favor CO2 and CO production from the reaction
Na2C03 + H20 + 2NaOH + CO2
and
4CO + Na2S + Na2SO4 + 4CO
The failure to observe significantly higher yields of C02 at the higher
temperatures implies that the kinetics of the H20-Na2S reaction are favored
over the H20-Na2CO3 reaction at the higher temperatures.
Effect of Sulfide
The effect of sulfide concentration on hydrogen yields is shown graphically
in Figure 3. It will be noted that there is little if any correlation. While
it would be expected that higher sulfide concentrations would show increased
hydrogen yields, theory predicts that the dependence is relatively insensitive
to sulfide concentration compared to sulfate or hydroxide.
Effect of Sulfate
It was found in previous work (Progress Report No. 5) that sodium sulfate,
under steady-state conditions, approximating equilibrium, reduced the yield of
hydrogen from the smelt-water (vapor) reaction. While the smelt compositions
investigated during this present period contained a variable, residual amount
of sulfate (.05-0.5%), no correlation could be made between the hydrogen yields
and sulfate concentration. It is possible that, in these experiments, the effect
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of other variables, notably hydroxide, overshadowed the effect of small differences
in sulfate content.
Correlation of Hydrogen Yield With CO and CO2
It was noted that lower hydrogen yields tended to be associated with higher
values of the combined yields of CO2 and CO. A correlation plot of the data
showing this relationship is shown in Figure 4.
Effect of Hydroxide
It has been pointed out in our previous progress report (Progress Report No.
5) that the hydroxide content of smelt is a variable affecting the products of its
reaction with water. Furthermore, from a theoretical point of view, if there is
only a small amount, or no hydroxide present, there is a stronger tendency for
the
Na2CO 3 + H20 2NaOH + CO2
reaction to take place. Thus, low initial hydroxide contents should favor higher
yields of CO2 and lower yields of hydrogen. It seemed significant that Runs B-7
and B-8, and to some extent B-10 contained the lowest hydroxide at the end of
the run, and at the same time produced the largest quantity of CO2, at least
for the first two 1 cc portions added.
Thus a possible mechanism, which has been previously proposed in Progress
Report No. 5,of so-called smelt sensitization appears to be the process of
forming enough sodium hydroxide in the smelt so that any subsequent, possibly
exothermic reaction can take place.
Effect of Green Liquor
One test of the effect of green liquor injection was made during Run B-5.
As three injections of water had not produced an explosion, a further injection
consisting of a 10% solution of synthetic green liquor was made. Such an
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injection produced a significant pressure peak and, at the same time resulted in
an increased production of hydrogen over the previous injection of water. It will
be noted that there was no significantly increased yield over the first injection
with water. However, because hydrogen yields tend to diminish with multiple in-
jections, it is concluded that the green liquor injection probably gave an in-
creased yield of hydrogen.
It will also be noted that the residue from this run contained 3.4% hydroxide,
a relatively high concentration.
Effect of 3 cc vs 1 cc of H 0
One test was carried out to check the relative yields of gas (H2, CO, CO2)
from an injection of 3 cc of water as contrasted to 1 cc. Test B-10 shows that
a somewhat lower yield of combustible gas was obtained.
Effect of Injection on Top of Smelt
In Run B-10 the water was. injected with the end of the injector approximately
1" from the top of the smelt. No significant difference was noted in the gas
yields.
Sodium Carbonate Runs (B-l. B-9)
There has been much speculation that the sodium carbonate-water reaction
is one of purely physical generation of steam. However, there is the possibility
that the endothermic reaction
Na2 CO3 + H20 - 2NaOH + CO2
takes place and modifies the rate of generation of steam. Furthermore, it
would be predicted that a purely physical reaction would ultimately be obtained
from multiple injections of water into molten sodium carbonate until sufficient
sodium hydroxide had formed so that no chemical reaction takes place (assuming
that there is no exothermic hydration of NaOH). Therefore, it was pertinent
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to determine the behavior of sodium carbonate, after it had been demonstrated in
Run B-1 that a significant reaction took place upon multiple injections of water.
It will be noted (Fig. 5) that in Run B-9, the combined yield of CO2 + CO was
initially high, then fell off at the 6th injection to 3.9% CO2 and 0.2% CO. At
the same time, chemical analysis showed that 4.4% NaOH, or 5.1 grams of NaOH had
been formed from 6 cc of water.
Both Na2CO3 runs showed the presence of CO and H2 and this is interpreted as
an interaction of CO2 and H20 with the crucible or wails of the vessel. As the
CO must come from C02, we have added these gases together as a measure of the CO2
evolved.
The Visicorder tracings (Figs. 6-7) after the first injection differed from
the first. It seemed to us that the pressure rise after the 5th injection was
one of the fastest reponses. No firm conclusions could be drawn from these
pressure responses.
It will be noted that at the higher temperatures of Run B-1 there was a
significantly higher yield of CO and CO2.
Interpretation of Pressure Peaks
Initial runs (B-l to B-6) were made with the Visicorder sensitivity set
for a maximum of 90 psig full scale. The pressure peaks observed were thus
quite small and as a result the sensitivity was increased to read 30 psi
full scale for the last four runs. Two typical peaks are shown in Figure 8
for Run B-8, a smelt considered to be, if any, only mildly explosive. As no
marked explosions were observed at the higher sensitivity, no quantitative
comparison of such traces can be made. It should be kept in mind that the
pressure peaks are those measured 9" above the surface of the melt and would
be expected to follow an inverse law, thus register much less than would be
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found, say, 1" from the explosion. Consideration is being given to a further
refinement of the transient pressure measuring device.
Qualitatively, the Visicorder appeared to show two types of pressure rises.
The apparent fastest rises were those shown by Runs B-3 and B-6, while Runs B-5,
B-7, B-8 and B-10 showed slower rise times and generally lower pressure peaks.
It appeared that there was a correlation between a significant production of CO2
and CO, and a relatively non-reactive smelt..
Although it is recognized that more data are needed to firmly establish
this point, it appears that the chemical reactions taking place have some effect
on the apparent reactivity of the smelts investigated. Thus, the milder behavior
of the latter runs mentioned above could be explained, because of the higher C02
and CO production, on the basis that the endothermic reaction
Na2CO + H20 + 2NaOH 4 CO2
takes place, thus slowing down, somewhat, the production of steam. It will be
noted, as mentioned above, that these runs contained low hydroxide at the end
of the run (and would be expected to be low in hydroxide at its beginning).
From a chemical point of view, such low hydroxide levels would tend to favor
the production of CO2 and CO.
Elemental Sodium Formation
The question of whether elemental sodium exists in smelt and plays a
part in the explosion mechanism has been raised many times.
While it was shown in our computer studies that sodium vapor could indeed
exist in the highly reducing atmosphere of the smelt bed, the question re-
mains whether sodium dissolves in smelt and exists in smelt in view of its
boiling point of 1616 F.
In order to demonstrate experimentally whether sodium will form and
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remain in molten smelt, a laboratory test has been devised. Briefly, a graphite
capsule, containing Na 2 S, Na2 CO 3 and carbon, will be heated in a vertical muffle
furnace so that the smelt will be under a pressure of 10 psi of products from
the reaction of the charge. The capsule will be quenched and sodium determined
by hydrogen evolution at room temperature.
The graphite crucibles are being machined, and the test is scheduled to start
September 7.
RECOVERY UNIT SHUTDOWN TESTS
The most desirable procedure for shutting down a Kraft-type recovery unit
during a period of distress has been a topic of discussion throughout the in-
dustry for many years. The central theme of this discussion has focussed upon
the question of whether residual quantities of active fuel and chemicals can be
safely handled by the unit.
One factor which has been questioned is quenching of the bed with with
limited quantities of partially volatile organic fuel after evaporation of
H20 and subsequent decrease in total air flow which might place the entire
furnace, boiler, and auxiliary equipment into the fuel-rich region. Such a
procedure was based, in part, on the philosophy that the furnace should be
cooled as quickly as possible so that the pressure parts of the recovery unit
would be protected. To date, this concern for the pressure parts of the unit
has apparently outweighed the possibility of gaseous-type hazards that might
arise.
B&W Progress Report No. 4 showed that large volumes of combustible gas
were liberated from the thermal decomposition of black liquor solids and
focussed attention on the possibility that the release of these gases con-
stituted a potential hazard inherent in the present shutdown procedure. As
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a result, a new approach to this problem was suggested and recommended for
evaluation on a commercial unit. This new approach involves the following
principles:
1. There is no quenching of the bed by black liquor.
2. Primary air flow is shut off.
3. The FD and ID fans are allowed to stay in operation; the unit
is thereby kept on the air-rich side during the entire shutdown.
Test Program
The D. M. Bare Company which has a B&W 122 ton/day recovery unit (Figure 9)
(PR-69) was equipped with a guillotine-type shut-off damper in the primary air
duct of the furnace. A test was planned and executed on July 23, 1965.
Objectives. The objectives for the test were (1) to determine the rate of
temperature depression in the bed and throughout the unit and (2) to determine
variations in gas composition during a shutdown.
Sequence of Events. Data on the recovery unit were obtained prior to, during,
and following the sequence of events listed below.
1. Assure that all auxiliary fuel is secured and unit is operating
at normal mill rating.
2. Shut off black liquor flow to furnace.
3. Open tertiary air damper wide (individual port dampers open
prior to test).
4. Shut off primary air by closing louver dampers.
5. Maintain total air flow equivalent to that which existed prior
to closing primary air louver.
6. Close emergency trip damper in primary air duct. Maintain same
total air flow.
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b. Panel Board Data - In order to record other critical temperatures,
pressures, flows, etc., 35 mm pictures of the entire panel board
were taken in 5 second intervals. See Figure 11.
Preliminary Results
(1) Smelt and gas temperature in primary zone of the furnace did not
drop off as rapidly as might be expected (see Figure 10). This
could have been due to observed leakage of combustion air from
the secondary to the primary windbox; thus the primary air possibly
was never completely stopped.
(2) Assuming that a representative gas sample was obtained during the
test, gas analysis at the furnace outlet (opposite nose) indicated
that there were no danger periods of gaseous type explosive mixtures
during the entire shutdown.
(3) The low gas temperature (see Figure 10) at the furnace nose indicates
that possibly air channeling was taking place, thereby questioning
in part result 2. The oxygen concentration at the boiler outlet
should show values of 10%+ oxygen as soon as the shutdown commenced.
(4) The analysis of the smelt samples, carried out to determine whether
chemical and/or physical changes were occurring, are in progress,
Visually, significant differences were noted between cooled smelts
as the shutdown proceeded. The smelt appeared to become denser
(granite-like) at the end of the test.
(5) The shutdown was a smooth one - no smelt rushes were observed.





c. Na20 - NaOH
EXPENDITURES
Expenditures through July 31, 1965 are as follows:
Labor plus overhead $103,816
Material 18,082
Total $121,898
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GAS ANALYSES AT FURNACE OUTLET
Concentration % by Volume (Dry Basis)
02 C 2 N2 Combustible
Time
Prior to Test 1 7% - Nil
During Testl >10% - Nil
21122 - - - Nil
2116 - 21203 20.8 0.2 79.0 Nil
21252 - 5.5 - Nil
21292 - 2.6 - Nil
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No. 6 Progress Report on
The Combustion Engineering Program for
Determining the Nature of and Remedies for
Explosive Reaction(s) Between Smelt and
Water in Kraft Chemical Recovery Furnaces
Introduction
The learning process almost invariably produces improvement in
an initial theory as experimental work progresses. The development of the
encapsulation mechanism theory is no exception. Ideas derived from the
heat transfer study in Progress Report No. 5 have permitted changes in
the encapsulation theory described in Progress Report No. 4 which make
it fit the new information better.
The heat transfer calculations of C-E's No. 5 Progress Report
showed that hot water and not steam would be contained in encapsulated
water of 0.3 to 3.0 ml volumes after the 0.030 second average induction
period for an explosion. A maximum temperature increase of only 60 oF
would be realized in this period. The increased internal capsule pressure
must then be due to thermal volumetric expansion of liquid water against
the containment shell of frozen smelt. Pressure development during even
this brief period could be substantial, ranging from 2000 to 6000 psi, as
shown by Figure 3 of the heat transfer study.
Rupture of the shell would be a triggering mechanism for the
explosive generation of steam produced when liquid water from the
fragmented capsule meets molten smelt. The internal pressure developed
in the capsule must serve principally to finely disperse the water and
propel it at high velocity through the body of molten smelt once rupture
occurs. The velocity of the water particles so produced would increase
steam production rate by reducing the thickness of the external steam film
on each water droplet. This film tends to impede heat transfer. The real
explosion then would be due to the explosive generation of steam after
capsule rupture placed its liquid water content in intimate contact with
the molten smelt.
The tensile strength of the encapsulating shell necessary for
an explosion would then have to be sufficient only to contain pressure
high enough to effect proper subdivision and ejection velocity of water
particles from the ruptured capsule.
The importance of encapsulation may be that it initiates a
steam-forming physical explosion like a blasting cap initiates detonation
of a chemical explosion of TNT. In each case, a small burst of energy may
trigger the development of a much larger quantity of PV (pressure volume)
energy from the rapidly expanding gases of the principal explosion.
It may be the case that capsule rupture and the explosive genera-
tion of steam from its small water content could initiate further mixing of
smelt with "bulk" (non-encapsulated) water above on the surface of the
smelt. Mixing of this larger volume of water with smelt would cause an
even larger steam explosion.
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Within the framework of this evolving physical explosion concept,
our laboratory work during the period of this report was primarily concerned
with two things:
1. Evaluation of the effect of extraneous sodium compouns other
than Na2S and Na2CO3 on the explosiveness of smelt.
2. Evaluation of possible safe quenching agents for the
prevention of smelt explosions.
Four commercial recovery furnace explosions have occurred and
been investigated by the writer (and others) since the initiation of this
project. An attempt to relate pertinent explosion literature and project
explosion consultants' opinions to the post-explosion evidence of the
four explosions and to our laboratory work is appended to this report.
(See Appendix).
Laboratory Experiments
a) Effect of sodium sulfate in smelt on explosive violence
The effect of Na2SO4 content of smelt on injection of water or
aqueous solutions has been of considerable interest. Earlier workkl had
shown that a 2-10% concentration of Na2S04 in smelt inhibited explosive
violence in dissolving tank type quenches in wnich the smelt was poured
into a large volume of water. A series of synthetic smelts of a wide
range of sulfidity was made up from Na2S and Na2CO3 to test the effect
of Na2SO4 on water injection explosions. Each was melted rapidly in a
graphite crucible so that reaction of Na2SO4 with the carbon crucible
would be minimized. Gaseous CO is evolved vigorously by this reaction
above about 1850 oF so initial smelt temperatures were kept below this
level and the surface of the smelt was observed often to control the
temperature. Analyses were made of several smelts which contained
Na2S04 before and after melting by the finally chosen procedure to
assure that the melting technique did not convert appreciable Na2SO4
to NaeS. Once 1800 °F smelt temperature was reached, the usual 3 ml.
successive injections of roan temperature water or water solution were
made until either an explosion resulted or the smelt solidified. Results
are shown in the appended Table 1.
Runs No. 1-3 indicated, as recognized from many previous tests,
that Na2S level must generally be above about 23% (approx. 30% TAPPI
sulfidity) for water injections to cause explosions. (This limit was
approximately 20% for dissolving tank explosions. However, the minimum
% NaeSfor explosions with both kinds of smelt-water mixing is lowered
significantly by presence of small percents of explosion intensifiers
like NaCl or NaOH in the smelt as discussed further in section (c) or
dissolved salts in the quench water.) Presence of 5.7 and 10% Na2SO4.
did not alter this non-violent behavior as shown in Runs Nos. 2 and 5.
Runs Nos. 4 and 5, however, showed that smelt below the threshold NaeS
content (approximately 20% Na2S, 25% TAPPI sulfidity) containing 5%
Na2S0 4 exploded very violently when either 10% green liquor (10% smelt
dissolved in water) or 10% sodium chloride was injected into the smelt.
The fact that both NaCl and green liquor produced the same increase of
explosive violence indicates that the Na2S does not have a unique role
in intensifying explosions. A better explanation for what appears to
be a general property of dissolved salts seems to be the one in C-E
Progress Report No. 5, i.e., that stable salts dissolved in water decrease
the life of the vapor blanket separating liquid water from hot smelt in a
capsule. This increases heat transfer rate and hence, explosiveness.
Explosions resulted from Runs Nos. 6 and 7. These four tests indicate
that up to 10% Na2S0 4 would be inadequate to inhibit explosive violence
even in low sulfide smelt if it contacted green liquor formed by the
dissolving of smelt by uncontrolled water in the furnace.
Runs Nos. 8 and 9 were made using a different kind of smelt
composition. This was low sulfide smelt sensitized with 5% NaCI as might
occur with smelt in a mill pulping salt-water borne logs. (Concentrations
of up to 12% NaCI were found in the smelt from one such mill.) It
exploded on addition of water by both injection and continuous stream
addition. The latter term has been referred to as "simulated tube
leak" in previous reports. Run No. 10 with this type of smelt containing
10% Na2S04 as inhibitor also exploded, but mildly.
The next series of Runs, Nos. 11 to 16 was made to test NaeS04
over a range of concentrations in moderate to high sulfide smelt (25%-
37% TAPPI sulfidity) which is more explosive. All exploded, some very
violently, on successive water injections even though NaeSO4 in 5.7 to
17.5% was present. RunsNos. 12 to 16 smelts all lie in a range of Na2S
proportions in Na2CO3 which exploded violently without Na2S04 ,in earlier
experiments. Comparing Runs Nos. 1 and 11 indicates that a proportion of
Na2SO high enough may even intensify explosiv violence, rather than
acting as smelt modifier to reduce explosive intensity.
Data in this Table prove within the limits of experimental
procedure used, that sodium sulfate does not act as an explosion inhibitor
on injection of either water or 10% water solutions of smelt or NaCl.
b) Effect of sodium hydroxide and sodium oxide in the smelt
A previous progress report by the Babcock and Wilcox research
group suggests the possibility of an explosion caused by an exothermic
reaction of water with NaeO, if Na2O is present in smelt. Because this
suggestion implies a non- combustible explosion, a type of explosion
of interest in the C-E program, experiments were conducted to indicate
the extent to which NaeO might be present in smelt, and the significance
to explosions of the reaction between water and Na20.
The first series of experiments was arranged to test the effect
of graphite crucibles on the formation of NaOH or Na2O. A 450 gram batch
of normal 28% Na2 S smelt was maintained molten at 1600°F and sampled after
15, 30 and 45 minute periods. (Fifteen minutes is the normal holding time
on batches for C-E explosion experiments.) No NaOH, Na2O or elemental
sodium, which are groused together by the TAPPI analysis method, was found
by duplicate analyses on each of the three samples.
Another batch of 28% Na2S smelt, prepared by the regular
procedure, was heated in like manner to 1800°F in a graphite crucible.
Here again no NaOH or Na2O was found by analysis after heating for 15, 30
and 45 minutes. When maintained at 1800oF smelt temperature or below,
graphite crucibles have not been fcund to modify the composition of
smelt. Smelt melted in crucibles made of Zr02, iron, and graphite gave
identical results in explosion tests with water injection. Graphite has
the advantage of being by far the most resistant material to corrosive
attack of smelt found by C-E experimenters. Graphite is also cheap and
readily available. It has excellent induction heating characteristics.
Carbon is a material "native" to the chemical recovery furnace since it
composes approximately 50% of char in the ash bed. These desirable
attributes and the above experimental results confirm the choice of
graphite as a crucible material for smelt explosion test studies.
Suppose Na20 was produced in smelt by chemical reaction in a
furnace bed. What effect would Na20 have on the explosion behavior of
the smelt when it contacted water? These and other questions were to
be answered in the next series of experiments. A detailed analysis (1)
of carefully taken and preserved samples of smelt from the spouts of
15 kraft mills operating under a wide variety of conditions was made by
the writer about ten years ago. The maximum concentration of NaOH plus
Na20 and Na (if present) in any sample was 3.2% on one but the range of
all other samples was 0.1 - 1.3%. If higher concentrations of these
ingredients had been present in smelt in the furnaces, they must have
been volatilized or changed by chemical reaction before reaching the
smelt spout.
First, a small pea-sized quantity of pure Na2O powder (95.7%
by analysis) was dropped into about 100 ml. of room temperature water to
gain some idea of the explosive violence of pure material on quenching.
It combined with water by the following chemical reaction:
Na20 + H20 2NaOH + 44.7 Kcal (per mol of Na2 0)
(gas)
or Na20 + H2 0 -- 2NaOH + 36.2 Kcal
(liquid)
Samples of this size and three times as large produced a few bubbles and
some warmth, but no real violence. Encouraged by these results we decided
to proceed with explosion tests of Na20 dissolved in a variety of melts.
Repeated successive 3 ml. injections of room temperature water were made
in each 450g batch of molten material at approximately lOOoF until it
either solidified or an explosion resulted. Melting was done in graphite
crucibles in the induction heating furnace by the usual technique. Results
are shown in Table II.
Runs Nos. 1 to 3 were made with varying proportions of NaOH in
Na2CO3. No concentration of NaOH in Na 2 CO3 produced explosions on
injections of water into melts of these compositions. Even l00% NaOH
did not explode. Runs Nos. 5 and 6 by contrast showed that 15% and 20%
sodium chloride in Na 2 CO3 caused violent explosions. These data again
emphasized that presence of sulfides is not required for an explosion.
Run No. 7 with 10% Na20 in Na2 C03 , which is about five times tne
normal level in plant smelt, did not explode on repeated water injections
into the molten material. (The NaeO in this and other experiments was
quickly added to already molten 1600 F melt in order to avoid prior
reaction with moisture from non-molten ingredients.) The 15% Na20 in
Na2CO3 of Run No. 8 exploded very violently. At this point it seemed
that enough calibration runs had been made to indicate roughly the lower
explosive limit for Na2 0 in Na2CO3 .
C-4
Runs Nos. 9 to 15 were made to compare the effect of Na2O and
NaOH in kraft smelt with that of NaC1. Run No. 9 showed again that
20% Na2S smelt did not explode with repeated successive water injections.
Neither were there explosions in Runs Nos. 10, 11, and 12 when 2% Na2O.
NaOH, and NaCl were added. The same kraft smelt containing 5% Na2O
exploded violently in Run No. 13, but 5% NaOH in Run No. 14 and 5%
NaCl in Run No. 15 also sensitized the smelt and produced the same order
of explosive violence.
It is concluded that neither Na2O nor NaOH in concentrations
normally found in smelt (up to about 2%) was sufficient to make 20% Na2S
smelt explode violently. Sodium chloride at 2% gave the same results.
Sodium oxide at 5% in 20% Na2S smelt sensitized it enough to produce
violent explosions. Both 5% sodium hydroxide and 5% sodium chloride,
however, produced the same violence as 5% sodium oxide in the same
smelt.
From these experiments it appears that no unusual hazard would
be presented by sodium oxide in kraft smelt at normal concentrations. At
up to about four times the normal concentration, the effect of Na20 was
indistinguishable from that of the same proportion of NaCl or NaOH. Due
to these results and the discovery that no detectable NaeO, Na, or NaOH
was created by the normal melting procedure for smelts in graphite
crucibles, we feel that Na2O, Na, and NaOH played no part in the violent
smelt-water explosions under nitrogen atmosphere in the spherical test
vessel which were described in the last C-E progress report.
c) Effect of sodium chloride combined with high sodium sulfide in
smelt on explosion inhibition by quench solutions
Considerable attention has been devoted to aqueous quenching
solutions because they still appear to offer the possibility for
developing a safe commercially-feasible method for shutting down a
recovery boiler rapidly should a water leak develop in the furnace.
Results and discussion of experiments on quenching agents have been
presented in the last four C-E progress reports.
Injection of quenching solutions into smelt has been used in
most experiments because this method of mixing provides the most violent
and consistent explosions with water. Thus injection represents the most
drastic laboratory condition known for mixing smelt and water. If a
quenching solution prevents explosions when injected into smelt under a
wide variety of conditions, it is considered a good candidate for further
study. But only after passing all tests without any kind of explosion
would it be recommended for furnace testing.
Although l0% aqueous ammonium sulfate solution succeeded in
inhibiting smelt explosions under a wide variety of simulated plant
conditions described in the last progress report, it had not until
recently been tried on high sulfidity smelt which contains sodium
chloride, a smelt composition known from previous work to increase
greatly the violence of smelt-water explosions.
A series of smelt compositions containing high Na2S content,
above about 23%, was made up to contain NaCl. A succession of 3 ml.
injections of water or aqueous solution was made into each molten 1800oF
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smelt until an explosion or solidification of smelt resulted. The
outcome of these experiments is reported in Table III. Run No. 1 showed
that high sulfidity smelt with 5% NaCl explodes violently on water
injection. (It does also without NaCl). Run No. 2 confirmed previous
data of C-E Progress Report No. 5 in illustrating that explosions with
low sulfide smelt containing 5% NaCl are inhibited successfully by 10%
ammonium sulfate solution.
Runs Nos. 3, 4 and 5, however, showed that the combination of
high sulfide with even 1% NaCl was not inhibited by 10% ammonium sulfate,
the most promising candidate developed to that time. Runs Nos. 6 and 7
(the latter run in duplicate) on the new standard smelt with high sulfide
and 5% NaCl showed that 10% ammonium bicarbonate did act as an inhibitor
where 10% ammonium sulfate had failed. It was reasoned that this
contrasting behavior might be due to the difference in rate at which
the two compounds form a vapor blanket on contact with hot smelt.
(Chloride-containing smelt may be able to develop more rapidly an
encapsulation shell strong enough to allow build-up of water-dispersing
pressure since it is believed to be a stronger per unit thickness than
smelt which contains no chlorides.) Runs Nos. 8 and 9 were hence made
with ammonium hydroxide which has a high vapor pressure at relatively
low temperature. The 9% (by weight as NH3) ammonium hydroxide solution
did successfully inhibit explosions but, like ammonium bicarbonate, it
might pose in-plant problems due to lack of stability on storage. Runs
Nos. 10 and 11 showed that almost the same concentration of ammonium hydroxide
would be necessary when combined with 10% ammonium sulfate solution.
Next it was decided to try the effect of increased concentrations
of ammonium sulfate in water solution. The 15% concentration at room
temperature in duplicate runs No. 12 inhibited explosions with chloride-
containing smelt. When chilled to 40oF in Run No. 13, however, it gave a
mild explosion probably due to the decreased rate of ammonia vapor
production. Chilling was used to approximate conditions of use in a
plant with outdoor storage of quench solution. Further increase in
concentration to 20% at room temperature in Run No. 14 inhibited
explosions in duplicate experiments. At this point it was reasoned
that the safest ammonium sulfate solution to use in a furnace would be
the one capable of safe quenching after greatest dilution with boiler
water from a tube leak. A forty per cent solution, which is the limit
of solubility of this salt at 32 oF, was chosen for further tests. Run
No. 15 at room temperature and No. 16 at 212OF, showed that 40% (NH4) 2S04
successfully inhibited explosions over this temperature range.
Run No. 17 showed that 40% solution worked even with 10% NaCl
dissolved in the smelt. Runs Nos. 18 and 19 showed that 40% solution also
was effective at 140 F and 32 F. Runs Nos. 20 and 21 showed that 40%
solution successfully inhibited the most violent quenching smelt to date
(with 10 and 15% NaC1, and high sulfide) even when the solution was chilled
to 36-38oF before injection.
It would seem in tests to date that 40% ammonium sulfate could
inhibit any plant smelt composition with whicn we are familiar. More tests
under a wide variety of simulated furnace conditions, nowever, must be run
before a definite recommendation can be made.
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d) Effect of anion type in quench solutions
It was a natural point of curiosity to wonder if some other
ammonium compound or gas-producing chemical would inhibit explosions
better than ammonium sulfate. A series of previously untried compounds
was made up in water solution and injected in 3 ml increments into very
high sulfide smelt with no chloride by the standard test procedure used
in other experiments. Results are shown in Table IV.
The 10% ammonium sulfate solution successfully inhibited
explosions, while 5% produced a surge showing border-line effectiveness.
The 5% NH4Cl of Run No. 4, by contrast with 5% (NH4)2S04 , gave a
violent explosion. The l0% NH4C1 of Run No. 5 gave a mild explosion
as did also Run No. 6 with l0% NH4Br, another halide. All halides tried
to date in either the smelt or in quenching solutions have increased
explosion violence. Ammonium acetate in Run No. 7 was an effective
inhibitor. It has poor stability on exposure to air and offers no
known advantage over (NH4)2S04. In Run No. 8 the 10% ammonium bisulfate
solution, which had a strongly acid reaction in water, was also effective.
This suggested that dilute sulfuric acid might also work since it would
generate gases (C02 and H2 S) on contact with smelt. Such was the case
if the acid were strong enough as demonstrated in Runs Nos. 10 and 11.
At present no advantage of acid solutions is recognized. Storage
and transfer to the furnace might cause corrosion problems. Pure ammonium
sulfate in 10% solution is slightly acid with a pH of 6.0. In another
experiment not shown in this table, the addition of enough sulfuric acid
to adjust the pH of 10% (NH4 )2S04 to 3.3 (as might occur with impure
commercial grade material) did not decrease its effectiveness. Buffering
ammonium sulfate solution with enough ammonia to put it on the alkaline
side, about pH 9, would protect the tanks and lines from corrosion. This
small proportion of free NH40H would be expected to slightly increase
explosion inhibition.
Run No. 12 with % ammonium sulfamate, NH4SO3NH2 , a fire
retardant material with high thermal decomposition point, 320OF, did
not work and neither did urea in Run No. 14 which decomposes above 270°F.
The 10% sodium sulfate solution of Run No. 13 caused an explosion. This
agrees with the analysis of a furnace explosion reviewed by the writer in
which salt cake in water solution (rather than in black liquor) had been
sprayed into the furnace bed. The 10% ammonium bicarbonate inhibited
explosions in duplicate Runs Nos.15 and 16. It has a high gas-producing
capacity but is thermally unstable in dry form and specially in aqueous
solution. The dibasic ammonium citrate was a successful inhibitor at
either l0% or 5% in Runs Nos. 17 and 18 but has the disadvantage (compared
with ammonium sulfate) of less stability and more cost.
To date there appear to be three serious candidates for further
study: ammonium sulfate, ammonium hydroxide, and ammonium bicarbonate.
We are concerned that the latter two solutions applied to the ash bed and
smelt in a furnace may have too much volatility of active ingredient, i.e.,
that they may lose gas supply too rapidly on contact with hot furnace gases
or alkaline char to retain enough for safe quenching of molten smelt below,
which is the real problem. Only further testing can establish whether this
is a valid criticism.
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Discussion of Quenching Agents
How much quenching solution would be necessary to cool the molten
smelt to a safe temperature in a 20' x 16' 300 ton C-E decanting bottom
furnace? Mr. L. J. Jacobs of C-E made a number of assumptions in performing
the following calculation. For instance, the sensible heat content of the
ash bed was disregarded. A 3.82" depth of molten smelt was assumed over
the entire bottom of the furnace. Furnace hearth dimensions of 19' 5/8"
x 15' 9 5/8" were taken to correspond with an actual contract. The smelt
would be cooled only to the solidification point, 1430OF. This would
require approximately 263 gallons of aqueous quench solution or 2200 lb,
assuming heat removal was not affected by the dissolved (NH4 )2 S04 . The
water of the solution would generate about 60,000 ft 3 of steam at 212-F
which would be expected to provide an inert atmosphere for combustion
reactions, especially in the bottom of the furnace. Chemical reactions
in the bed like pyrolysis of black liquor and the water gas reaction
would probably be quenched speedily by spraying liquid water solution
on the bed, since aqueous solutions have a high heat capacity.
What makes same aqueous chemical solutions non-explosive on
injection into molten smelt? The answer seems to lie in their ability to
create large volumes of gas quickly on contacting smelt. The gas
production necessary for a successful aqueous quenching agent can come
from several types of reactions: (a) the production of vapor by
volatilization of a high vapor pressure material like ammonium hydroxide,
volatile compounds like acetone and methyl alcohol, or even hot water above
187°F. (b) the chemical reaction of smelt with aqueous solutions like
dilute sulfuric acid (to give C02 and H2 S) or ammonium sulfate (to give
ammonia) or (c) the thermal decomposition of compounds like ammonium
bicarbonate (which yields H20, C02 , and NH3 ).
The gas blanket provided inside the capsule by such quenching
agents is believed to decrease the rate of heat transfer from the molten
smelt to water inside the capsule and hence also the thickness of the
surrounding frozen smelt and the temperature of the encapsulated water.
In addition we believe this gas blanket provides a compressible volume
inside the shell which is able to absorb thermal expansion of the
encapsulated liquid water without great increase in internal capsule
pressure. The presence of this enveloping gas film around the enclosed
volume of water would thus decrease the chance of an explosive encapsulation.
A vapor blanket would decrease the build-up of water-atomizing pressure if a
water-containing capsule did form and rupture.
Quenching agent candidates can now be chosen easier since several
tentative criteria have been established which simplify selection. For
instance, a quenching agent ideally should: (1) generate large volumes of
non-flammable, non-toxic gas readily on rapid heating in aqueous solution
below 212°F or on chemical reaction with smelt, (2) have sufficient
stability in aqueous solution to allow long-term storage in metal tanks
over a range of temperatures normal to in-plant and outdoor conditions,
(3) leave no residue on application to smelt which will contaminate the
the chemical recovery system, (4) be highly soluble in water, and (5)
be cheap, non-toxic, stable on storage in solid form, non-corrosive, and
readily available in commercial quantities. Some of these qualifications




Work in the final four months of the project in 1965 will
concentrate primarily on the development of practical remedies for
smelt explosions in furnaces. The mechanism studies have provided several
clues to measures which could possibly prevent explosions in the field.
Areas to be covered include the following:
1) The application of aqueous quench solutions to the smelt and ash bed
as soon as a tube leak is discovered. (A good automatic system
for leak detection would add considerable utility to this system.)
The three candidates mentioned earlier, ammonium sulfate, ammonium
bicarbonate, and ammonium hydroxide will be screened extensively
by tests which simulate a wide variety of furnace conditions.
Sane of the variables to be studied are the effect of smelt
composition (Na2S, NaOH, and NaCl), presence of ash bed and
black liquor, tests on samples of plant smelt from several mills,
method of addition of quench solution, and a detailed analysis of
decomposition products, both gases and solids. Additional
quenching agents will be screened concurrently as they come to
our attention.
2) The tendency of black liquor itself to explode physically in contact
with smelt will be explored more thoroughly above the 35% maximum
solids concentration which exploded in previous tests. New means
of injecting heavy liquors will be tried in order to determine
more exactly the upper concentration (and inorganic salt content)
which can explode under the best possible mixing conditions. The
effect of strong black liquor applied to the surface of smelt on
cooling rate and accessibility to water will also be studied.
3) A limited additional number of smelt additives to modify its explosiveness
on contact with water will be tried. Fifteen are on hand ready
for testing.
4) A scale up of water quantities from 5 ml. maximum at present in the
plywood booth to 50 or 100 ml should be made in the spherical
vessel in order to get a better idea of the pressure signature
of larger explosions more characteristic of those in an operating
furnace. Such data would be useful in the stress analysis study
of furnace explosions being made by Mr. R. Robinson at Illinois
Institute of Technology Research Institute.
Completion of these additional studies should allow us to make
definite recommendations about remedial measures worthy of study in a black
liquor-fired semi or full scale furnace. This may be the next step beyond
the present research contract.
Conclusions
(1) Under proper circumstances molten smelt can react physically with
submerged liquid water very rapidly to produce steam explosively.
(2) Sodium sulfate in the smelt does not inhibit physical smelt-water
explosions.
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(3) The normal procedure for preparing experimental smelt in graphite
crucibles does not produce significant quantities of Na2O,
NaOH, or elemental sodium.
(4) The presence of Na20, Na0H, or NaCl in laboratory smelts results in
equivalent behavior on contact with water indicating that no
unusual explosive contribution is to be expected from the
presence of Na20.
(5) High sulfide smelt (above about 25% Na2S) with sodium chloride is
a particularly explosive composition hard to inhibit by
quenching solutions. The 40% ammonium sulfate solution in
water, either hot or cold, successfully quenched high sulfide-
chloride smelts. More work on this and other quenching
solutions will be necessary before a recommendation for plant
trial can be made.
Expenditures on the C-E Smelt-Water Explosion Study
Costs (cumulative) of the Combustion Engineering, Inc. study as














































5 10% Green Liquor
5 10% NaCl





























* Crucible shattered by explosion
V is volent
VV is very violent
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TABLE II
Effect of NaOH, NaCl, and Na2O in Melts
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- 20% Na2S smelt
5.NaOH - 20% Na2S smelt
5 NaCl - 20% Na2S smelt
* Cruicible shattered
V is violent








































































































10% (NH4)2S04, 3% NH40H





212°F 40% (NH4)2 S04
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10% Na 2S0 4
10% Urea (NH2 )2CO
10% NH4 HCO 3
10% Dibasic NH4 citrate
5% Dibasic NH4 citrate
* Shattered Crucible
V is violent










































Preliminary Analysis of Recovery Furnace Explosion Damage
(a) Shock waves developed by smelt-water explosions
A chemical reaction to be explosive must have three characteristics(2.
The heat of reaction is a criterion of the efficiency of the explosive material
and is its most important characteristic. Thus a chemical reaction must be
highly exothermic to be explosive in nature. Second, it must take place at a
high rate, which distinguishes normal chemical reactions from explosive ones.
Finally, a chemical reaction Must form a gas. For instance, the folloing well-
known thermite reaction is rapid and highly exothermic, but does not form a gas.
It hence does not explode.
2A1 + Fe203 --- A120 3 + 2Fe + 198Kcal (99Kcal/mol of Al)
It can therefore be concluded that only the simultaneous combination of
these three basic factors: exothermicity, high process rate, and gas formation, can
guarantee a chemical type explosion.
Higgins and Schultz ( 3 ) , in their thorough study of molten metal-water inter-
actions which might take place in case of a run-away nuclear reactor, described a
number of interesting results which seem to contrast with those from the present
study. They mixed intimately the molten metals, uranium, zirconium, aluminum, so-
dium-potassium alloy, and stainless steel with water under various conditions and
recorded the pressure waves and other variables in a highly instrumented system.
Mixing was accomplished by spraying the molten metals into water and also by finely
dispersing molten metal submerged in water with a blasting cap. With the two methcds
of mixing, the results were equivalent when particle-size distribution was approxi-
mately the same.
Higgins and Schultz state that the chemical reaction of molten aluminum
with water (which occurs if the metal is very hot and finely divided) is highly exo-
thermic and produces hydrogen, and that the reaction is nil up to 2138°F. (The
melting point of aluminum. is 1220°F.)
2A1 + 3H 2 0 -->Al2 03 + 3H2 + 160Kcal(80Kcal/mol of Al)
The proportion of aluminum reacting with water (approx. 60%) was higher
than for other metals tested.
Higgins and Schultz recorded the pressure rise times on oscillograms (re-
produced as Figure 1). To quote them:
"The pressure pulses measured in the explosion dynamometer
were primarily due to the liberation and expansion of the
hot hydrogen gas.......
"In observing the pressure rise time, it is evident that the
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metal-water reactions are not high-order explosions --
taking milliseconds rather than microseconds to attain peak
pressure. The metal-water reactions could be described as
deflagrations instead of detonations, but are slightly more
brisant than black powder, as indicated by the rates of
pressure rise ..... From the above considerations and from
the absence of shattering-type damage, it was concluded that
the effect of shock waves was not important in these tests."
Contrast these rates of chemical reaction of molten metals and water with
the pressure signature (pressure versus time trace) of a typical C.E. laboratory
smelt-water physical explosion reproduced as Figure 2. It can readily be seen that
physical smelt-water explosions: (1) average 0.1 to 3 milliseconds and are hence
5 to 300 times faster, (2) have much faster rise and decay times, and (3) are of
an entirely different type from deflagrating chemical reactions of molten metals
with water. The wave from a smelt-water explosion by contrast is a shock wave
produced from explosively-generated steam. This concept is discussed in more de-
tail in the section which follows.
The violent smelt-water explosions in nitrogen atmosphere described in C.E.
Progress Report No. 5 ruled out combustion as an explanation for these laboratory
explosions.
(b) Inspection of four explosions
The distribution of damage in all four chemical recovery furnace explo-
sions inspected by the writer during the course of this study has been of the same
general pattern but the explosion intensity has varied widely. Two of them pro-
duced little easily-evident damage in the furnace up to an elevation one floor
above the operating level (approx. 25' above the molten smelt level). Here and
above the buckstays became bulged on all four sides. Corner bolts above this level
were broken in the case of powerful explosions. In three out of four cases, the
corners of the furnace above the operating floor generally split open vertically
as designed to meet severe pressure surges. The economizer casing usually was
opened. In two of the four explosions substantial (1"-4") deflections were noted
in heavy I beams under localized areas of the furnace bottom. Beams were not
measured after the first two explosions.
An unusually severe series of multiple explosions occurred over a four
minute period in one furnace. The smelt was cleaned thoroughly from the surface
of floor tubes in the entire bottom. Two highly localized dish-shaped depres-
sions about a yard in diameter were found in the floor tubes. One, 4 1/2" deep,
was near the left rear corner. The other, also 4 1/2" deep, was near the middle
of the furnace front close to the center smelt spout. The corner depression
matched an approx. 5" localized outward displacement of adjacent vertical water
wall tubes extending upward about 4'. The left rear vertical corner (only) of
the furnace was ripped open over a 6' vertical distance starting 3' above smelt
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level. The 14" wide flange I beams beneath the furnace floor had been de-
flected 2 1/2 to 4". The furnace roof was opened and minor casing damage to
the economizer was incurred. On hydrostatic testing the furnace, a number of
leaks were found where wall tubes had been torn loose from welds to channels
directly above the corner floor depression. Correspondingly, the depression
near the center of the furnace floor matched the location where the ripped
smelt spout "can" is believed to have placed water in the molten smelt.
Two consultant explosion specialists examined the damage in this
furnace and agreed that the energy density required to create the depressions (4)
was far above that which would have been produced by a combustible gas mixture.(4)
(c) Theory on distribution of furnace damage
It is believed that the damage in three furnace explosions and major
damage in the fourth was due to a physical smelt-water explosion mechanism.
These explosions liberated high density PV energy (in the shock wave range) in
a limited area of the furnace bottom where water contacted molten smelt. The
decaying explosion pressure wave then spread through the remainder of the fur-
nace structure. The general pattern of damage on furnace structures which at
first glance might suggest gas explosions high in the furnace, may instead be
the result of the distribution of furnace containment strength and the effects
of either a shock wave alone or a shock wave combined with a rapid pressure rise
similar in characteristics to a combustible explosion.
In a significant number of chemical recovery furnace explosions, we be-
lieve that the distribution of damage observed could not have been caused by a
rapid increase in pressure of the total furnace atmosphere in such a large en-
closure. In these cases, the distribution of damage can best be accounted for
on the basis that it was caused by a shock wave with or without a deflagration
wave.
From a study of the available literature, the large scale liberation of
flammable gas by chemical reaction of molten smelt and water (if such occurred
in a furnace) and its subsequent ignition could not have caused such a shock wave.
This follows from the fact that ignition of a limited amount of flammable gas in
a furnace would not result in a detonation but rather in a deflagration type of
explosion which would not produce a shock wave. A deflagration wave, which can
produce a maximum of about 150 psi pressure increase, travels at subsonic speed.
Hot gaseous products from the explosive combustion of a flammable gas mixture
expand and create a pressure increase through the whole volume of the container.
This would hence distribute pressure rather evenly to nearby walls of the furnace.
The postulation that damage was created by a shock wave from the explo-
sive production of steam in chemical recovery furnaces is supported by several
observations. These include the following:
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1) Localized depressions in the floor tubes which could not have been
created by combustible gas explosions.
2) Since no visible flames were observed to issue from furnace open-
ings in the four recent explosions, a combustible gas explosion
is not indicated. Some explosions occurred while there was an ac-
tively burning bed in the furnace.
3) The significant deflections of heavy I beams beneath the furnace
could not be caused by explosion of combustible gas mixtures. The
development of pressure from a deflagration explosion would cause
opening of the furnace corners which would relieve the pressure
before significant floor beam deflection could occur.
4) From the accounts read, the nature of and damage from plant explo-
sions caused by introducing molten steel, aluminum, and cobalt, as
well as molten non-metals like bauxite (Al203 ) and sodium chloride
into waterr is strikingly similar to that from smelt-water explosions.
None of these former explosions could be attributed to the formation
and subsequent oxidation of a flammable gas.
Shock waves, like sound, have directional effects. They can be re-
flected from surfaces and when wave fronts coincide after reflection, a more power-
ful force may be applied to a localized area. Shock waves of numerically small
pressure magnitude per square inch can create significant damage, as illustrated
by data of the following table (5).
Over-pressure* in
Shock Wave, PSI Damage
0.5 to 1.0 Shatters glass windows.
1.0 to 2.0 Shatters corrugated asbestos siding. Corrugated
steel or aluminum paneling fails and buckles.
2.0 to 3.0 Concrete wall panels, 8 or 12 inches thick (not
reinforced) shatter.
2.5 Moderate damage to light steel frame industrial
buildings.
4.0 Moderate damage to medium steel frame industrial
buildings and to wall bearing, brick buildings.
5.5 Moderate damage to steel frame office type build-
ings and to reinforced concrete frame and wall
multi-story buildings. Severe damage to wall-
bearing brick buildings.
* Pressure above atmospheric
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How can a physical smelt-water explosion in the bottom of a furnace
result in damage far above to the casing, corners, refractory, and even in
the economizer? Another part of the answer may lie in the distribution of
structural strengths in various part of the furnace itself. The bottom
and lower welded furnace walls are much stronger than the upper walls and
economizer casing. The furnace roof in many designs is also strong. It
may be a correct analogy to compare resistance to explosion force between
a shot gun with muzzle plugged by mud and a furnace with a smelt explosion
in the bottom. In the former case, the muzzle often "banana peels" i.e.,
splits in several longitudinal sections when fired, while the breech where
the shell was exploded remains intact because of its greater tensile strength
produced by thicker metal. These opinions should not be assumed to take issue
with current furnace design, since it would be technically infeasible to de-
sign an explosion damage-proof furnace.
The fact that all explosions to date have been described as "muffled"
or "rumbling" probably reflects the sound-deadening effect of the heavier -
armored bottom location in which they are believed to occur. (Lab explosions
give a short "crack" which implies high velocity. Transducer pressure traces
of the shock waves reinforce this view.) The proposed hearth area location
of these explosions may provide an explanation also for the extremely low
injury rate of personnel who usually work at the smelt spout or operating floor
elevations of the recovery furnace.
No chemical recovery furnace explosion to date has been observed by
those nearby to expel flames from the furnace openings, although this question
is always asked. The operators usually refer only to blinding clouds of steam
and finely divided black ash driven from the smelt spouts, liquor gun openings,
and fissures in the casing created by the explosion.
For the reasons outlined in this section, it is believed that all four
explosion sites recently inspected by the writer involved contact of water or
some aqueous solution (other than strong black liquor) with molten smelt. Such
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